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Abstract

embers of the World Trade Organization are violating Article 6 of the Agreement on the Application
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures by failing
to adapt their sanitary and phytosanitary measures to regional
conditions. Instead, they continue to impose broad, trade-restrictive measures that are based on national borders instead of on a
regional basis. The sanitary and phytosanitary (pest and disease)
status of a nation is unlikely to be uniform throughout a country, and, consequently, under Article 6 of the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Members
are required to adapt their restrictions on imports to conditions
that prevail on a regional basis as opposed to on a national one.
Failure to adhere to the obligations under Article 6 has a disparately large impact on developing and least developed countries
because those countries are inherently more susceptible and less
well equipped to deal with infections of disease and infestations
of pests. The result is that a greater number developing and least
developed countries are systematically precluded from effectively engaging in the international trade of their animal and plan
products for no scientifically supported reason.
Article 6 of this Agreement has been the subject of multilateral discussion and confusion since its inception. It has only
been formally interpreted at the Dispute Settlement Body three
times (once in June 2015, once in July 2015, and once in August
2016). This confusion has led to a poor understanding of associated obligations and to Members’ imposition of trade-restrictive
measures which violate Article 6. It appears that some Members
are taking advantage of the poor understanding of obligations
under Article 6 to raise unnecessary and over-restrictive barriers to trade. These barriers include those protecting domestic
industries at the expense of frustrated exporters, and barriers
ill-tailored to regions affected by disease.
This Comment seeks to clarify the obligations under Article
6 and to illuminate current violations. It applies the legal analysis from the July 2015 WTO decision, United States – Measures
Affecting the Importation of Animals, Meat and other Animal
Products from Argentina, to current measures. Through that
analysis, this Comment unveils some of the egregious violations
of Article 6 that barricade sustainable development in developing and least developing countries today.

I. Introduction
On July 24, 2015, the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) of
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) circulated a panel report
interpreting Article 6, “Adaptation to Regional Conditions,” of
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures1 (“SPS Agreement”).2 Article 6 of the SPS Agreement
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mandates that Members adapt their measures governing the
importation of consumable goods, plants, and animals to the
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (“SPS”) conditions of the regions
from which they are importing, rather than applying those measures broadly to entire countries.3 As diseases and infections do
not abide by State lines, a regional approach is a safe and less
trade-restrictive approach than a nation-based one, and therefore better conforms to the WTO’s goal of trade liberalization.
Further, from a development standpoint, the effective implementation of Article 6 is paramount for less developed nations
because they are more susceptible to SPS-related harms, and,
therefore, more likely to needlessly suffer from the imposition
of trade restrictions that are not adopted on a regional basis.4 The
effect of failures to properly implement Article 6 into Members’
SPS regimes slows the growth of less developed economies
by unnecessarily precluding trade in the name of non-existent
health risks.5
A theoretical example of how this obligation applies is illustrative: imagine New Zealand wishes to export its lamb products
to Germany. New Zealand is a nation comprised of two islands:
the North Island and the South island. Lamb from the Southern
Island is fraught with Foot-and-Mouth disease, but there is no
scientific evidence that the lamb from the Northern Island suffers from the disease. In accordance with Article 6 of the SPS
Agreement, Germany must tailor its border measures applicable
to the importation of lamb from New Zealand to the regional
conditions that exist in New Zealand, and, therefore, it may block
imports of lamb from the South Island of New Zealand, but not
from the North.
Yet, there has been some confusion as to the implications
of Article 6. Namely, Members are unsure to what extent they
must tailor their measures to accommodate for small regions in
exporting countries when the majority of that country has been
affected by pest or disease. Members (and the DSB)6 also struggle to define some practical applications of Article 6; how much
time does a Member have to adapt its measures when conditions
in previously infected exporting regions improve?
United States – Measures Affecting the Importation of
Animals, Meat and other Animal Products from Argentina
(“United States – Animals”) was the second occasion upon which
a panel had the opportunity to formally interpret Article 6.7 The
recent decision helped to clarify some of the above-mentioned
confusions through the Panel’s incorporation of the obligations
held within Articles 5.78 and 89 of the SPS Agreement to the
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practical application of Article 6. The Panel recognized that
the procedure for obtaining recognition of a region as pest or
disease-free necessitates a risk assessment,10 which is governed
by Article 5 of the SPS Agreement, and an approval procedure,11
which is governed by Article 8 of the SPS Agreement. The Panel
acknowledged that a Member imposing a barrier to trade based
on SPS factors has an obligation to undertake a risk assessment
“within a reasonable period of time” in accordance with Article
5,12 and to proceed with approval procedures “without undue
delay” in accordance with Article 813 when dealing with requests
for recognition of regional pest and disease conditions.14
By incorporating time constraints on the adaptation of
relevant measures, this interpretation gives Article 6 teeth. It
imposes an obligation not only to recognize regional conditions,
but also to adapt measures in accordance with those conditions in
a timely manner, thus effectively addressing the recurring issue
where a Member has created a disease-free area within national
boarders, “only to face significant delays obtaining recognition
by their trading partners.”15
Under the analysis that the Panel applied in United States–
Animals, it is clear that some Members continue to violate
Article 6 of the SPS Agreement by applying over-broad SPS
measures and failing to adapt them to prevailing SPS conditions
on a regional basis. This Comment highlights this phenomenon
through a selection of case studies.16 Part II of this Comment
discusses the principles behind SPS measures and pertinent facts
of current scenarios where measures have not been tailored to
regional conditions.17 Part III analyzes those facts under the
legal framework propounded in United States – Animals.18 Part
IV recommends that the analysis that was applied in United
States–Animals be adopted by the WTO Membership as a useful
and positive step in the effective implementation of Article 6.19
However, Part V concludes that while United States – Animals is
useful, it does leave some important questions unanswered: what
constitutes a “reasonable time” and “undue delay” in this context? These questions must be answered in order for Members
to fully understand and implement this important Article and in
order to mitigate the unnecessary harms and impediments that
are falling particularly hard on developing economies.20

II. Background
The SPS Agreement is one of the covered agreements under
the WTO.21 The Agreement governs the implementation of SPS
measures, which are designed to protect human, animal, and
plant life.22 The SPS Agreement emphasizes the importance of
sound scientific evidence as the basis of implementation of such
measures.23
Today, as taxes, tariffs, and duties are continually lowered,
Members employ alternative, more technical means to protect
their domestic suppliers and restrict access to their markets.24
One of the SPS Agreement’s mandates is to attempts to reduce
the application of non-essential, over trade-restrictive measures
that block goods from entering countries when there is no
scientifically based reason for such restrictions.25 Despite this
mandate, at the 2015 “Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Fall 2016

Measures” hearing, the WTO Membership voiced a record
number of concerns relating to inappropriate and over-restrictive
uses of SPS measures.26 The nature of the measures in question
brings to light concerns for sustainable development because
of these measures’ disparate impact on developing economies.
This Section first explains what Members’ obligations are under
Article 6 of the SPS Agreement, and then relates the relevant
facts of some regimes that are violating that Article.

A. The SPS Agreement’s foundation and how
it pertains to Article 6, “Adaptation to
Regional Conditions”
The SPS Agreement is not a set of standards to which all
Members must adhere, but rather a set of rules that governs the
implementation of SPS measures.27 It provides a set of principles under which SPS Measures must be adopted by Member
States, affording them latitude in the specific Measures that they
elect to adopt. One principle that is enshrined in the Agreement,
for example, is the broad requirement that measures be based
in science. This strikes the balance between allowing Members
to enforce the health standards that they deem necessary and
requiring that those standards be scientifically provably necessary.28 Article 6 is a perfect reflection of that same balance.
Thereunder, Members may adapt measures that limit or preclude
imports from areas that have been affected by SPS-related diseases or infestations, as long as those measures are scientifically
justified, and appropriately tailored to the affected area(s).29

1. Obligations under Article 6, “Adaptation to
Regional Conditions”
Members have had difficulty understanding their obligations under Article 6 since the inception of the SPS Agreement.
In 1999, the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
adopted the first Review of the Operation and Implementation of
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, which concluded that Article 6 required further development.30 Further, Article 6 was an item on the agenda for that
Committee in every meeting from 2003 through 2007,31 and
has continued to be an issue through 2016.32 Limiting restrictions on trade to areas affected by disease or pests is a popular
concept throughout the Membership of the WTO. However, the
Membership seems to have difficulty agreeing on the implementation of this restriction. Some Members lobby for hard line rules
on the length of the process for recognition of disease or pest-free
areas, while others advocate for a more flexible approach.33 As a
result, Members continue to express frustrations with acquiring
pest or disease-free status under Article 6 of the SPS Agreement.
Members’ frustrations stem from systems that are in
place which may be deemed to violate Article 6 of the SPS
Agreement.34 Importing Members’ slow processing, or failure
to process, requests for recognition of disease or pest-free areas
causes regimes where importers do not recognize such areas in
a timely manner, or worse, they do not recognize such areas at
all.35 This leads to vexation amongst exporters, and potential for
claims at the DSB under Article 6.
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a. The United States–Animals Panel’s framework for
analysis under Article 6
The Panel in United States – Animals clarified how to
approach an analysis under Article 6 of the SPS Agreement.
The Panel first assessed, through textual analysis, the individual
obligations under each of the three paragraphs of Article 6 (6.1,
6.2, and 6.3), and then analyzed the application of the Article as
a whole.36
Accordingly, the Panel began with an examination of the
text of Article 6.1.37 It determined that “adapt[ing]” a measure
means the measure is calibrated to the prevailing food, animal,
and plant health conditions in areas affected by the measure; the
measure does not unnecessarily restrict goods from areas that do
not pose health risks.”38 The Panel also briefly considered the
definition of an “area,” and adopted the definition in the text of
the provision: “all of a country, part of a country, or all or parts
of several countries.”39 The Panel concluded that the second
sentence of Article 6.1 “presupposes that Members undertake an
assessment of the SPS characteristics of a region.”40 It iterated
that the list contained in the second sentence of Article 6.1, enumerating factors to be considered when a Member is conducting
such an assessment, is not exhaustive because of the inclusion of
the term “inter alia” 41 in that sentence.42 Thus, once a Member
has assessed the relevant factors to determine the SPS conditions
of a region, then it must adapt its SPS measures in accordance
with its findings.43
The Panel also addressed the meaning of paragraph 2
of Article 6.44 It determined that the terms “recognize” and
“concepts” indicate that Members must accept the validity of
‘pest- or disease-free areas’, and that they must consider them
in applying SPS measures.45 Additionally, the Guidelines to
Further the Practical Implementation of Article 6, adopted by
the SPS Committee in 2008, emphasized that the procedure for
gaining recognition of a pest or disease-free area should be publicized and accessible.46 The Panel’s determination with regard
to Article 6.2 effectively forces Members to consider SPS conditions on a regional basis form a conceptual standpoint, and to
publicize their individual interpretations of that concept.
Article 6.347 is directed only at exporting Members. The
Panel determined that an exporting Member must establish that
the area that it seeks to have recognized as pest or disease-free
is indeed pest or disease-free and is likely to remain an area of
such characteristics. So, an exporting Member that is subject to
an SPS-based trade barrier imposed by an importing Member
carries the burden of adequately demonstrating that its area is
and is likely to remain a pest and disease-free area in order to
overcome the importing Member’s barrier.48
Perhaps the most important determination in the Panel’s
analysis was that Members’ obligations under Articles 5.749
and 850 of the SPS Agreement also applied to the obligations
under Article 651: The process of recognizing a region as a pest
or disease-free area under Article 6 must be carried out without
“undue delay,” and within “a reasonable period of time.”52
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b. The United States–Animals Panel’s framework applied
In United States – Animals, the allegedly offending measure
was an American ban on Argentinian beef. Various regions of
Argentina had suffered from infestations of foot and mouth disease for a number of years, and, accordingly, the United States
maintained a ban on Argentinian Beef since 2001. Argentina did
request recognition of Northern Argentina and the Patagonia
region as FMD-free, but the relevant authority, the Animal
and Plant Health Inspections Service (“APHIS”), did not grant
recognition.53
The Panel in United States–Animals considered Argentina’s
claim that the United States was in violation of its obligations
under Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement because the United
States had failed to adapt its measures to the SPS characteristics
of the Patagonia region of Argentina, and instead banned beef
products from all of Argentina.54 Argentina’s successful claim
was that under the United States’ framework for recognition of
pest and disease-free regions55, the United States failed to recognize Patagonia as a disease-free area despite Argentina’s requests
for recognition Argentina having adequately demonstrated that
Patagonia was, and was likely to remain, disease-free.56
The United States–Animals Panel noted at the outset of its
analysis that the Animals and Plant Health Inspection Service
(“APHIS”)57 had not yet recognized Patagonia as a region
within Argentina, but, instead, viewed Argentina as one single
region.58 The Panel then endeavored to answer whether the
United States’ failure to recognize Patagonia as a region within
Argentina deserving different treatment amounted to a violation
of the United States’ obligations under Article 6.1 of the SPS
Agreement to adapt its measures to regional conditions.59
The Panel assessed whether Argentina had objectively
failed to demonstrate that Patagonia was FMD-free and likely to
remain so.60 The United States’ primary argument for not adapting its measure to Patagonian conditions was that APHIS had
not yet completed its evaluation of the area, so it was unable to
afford Patagonia disease-free status.61 This argument fell flat, as
APHIS itself had declared that it was satisfied that it had sufficient information to proceed with finalization of its review,
yet it did not complete that review.62 Further, the Panel conducted its own review of Patagonia’s conditions and concluded
that Patagonia was indeed FMD-free. The Panel decided that
Argentina had objectively demonstrated that Patagonia was and
was likely to remain FMD-free in accordance with Article 6.1.63
The Panel then assessed if Argentina had granted reasonable access to APHIS for it to conduct an inspection, testing, and
other relevant procedures.64 The Panel highlighted that Argentina
had agreed to two site visits from APHIS: one in 2003 and one in
2009.65 In light of its earlier findings under Articles 5.7 and 8,66
the Panel determined that the United States had failed to complete its review of the prevailing SPS conditions in Patagonia
without undue delay and to adapt its measure appropriately
within a reasonable period of time.67 This, in combination with
the United States’ failure to adapt its measures accordingly, constituted a violation of Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement.68
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

B. Regimes currently in violation: Indonesia
and Russia
The United States–Animals case will serve as a backdrop to
analyze Chile’s concerns with respect to Indonesia’s restrictions
on importation of fruits and the EU’s concerns with respect to
Russia’s restrictions on importation of pigs and pork products,
both of which will be discussed further below. These two cases
are good examples for discussion in the context of violations of
Article 6 of the SPS Agreement for three main reasons: First, the
restrictive measures raised by Indonesia and Russia are necessarily based on SPS conditions, which enables a discussion of
Article 6’s application to those measures. Second, the restrictions applied by Indonesia and Russia take different forms which
permits an exploration of different types of SPS measures and
Article 6’s application thereto. Finally, both of these examples
are of ongoing trade restrictions that impact international trade
across countries that are in different stages of development,
and demonstrate the existing abuse and/or misunderstanding of
Article 6 by WTO Members through their failure to adapt measures to regional conditions.

1. Indonesia-Fruit
In 2012, Indonesia notified the SPS committee of its intention to prohibit imports of fruits and vegetables into Tanjung
Priok, one of the main ports for imports in the nation’s capital,
Jakarta.69 Indonesia claimed that this prohibition was to preserve
plant health and human health due to plant pests or disease and to
protect its territory from other damage from pests.70 Indonesia’s
trading partners, including Chile, were concerned about the consequences of this prohibition.71
Chile notified the SPS committee of its concerns regarding the Indonesian measure in July, 2014.72 By that time, the
Indonesian measure had been in place for three years and was
affecting trade considerably.73 Considering Chile was the fourth
largest importer of fruits to Indonesia in 2013,74 and that fruit
constitutes 7% of Chilean exports75, it has a significant interest in Indonesia quickly recognizing it as fruit fly-free. Chile
provided Indonesia with the necessary documents establishing
it as a fruit-fly free region and invited Indonesia to perform a
“technical visit” to Chile to conduct relevant risk-assessment
procedures and to complete Indonesian’s recognition process.76
The Indonesian authorities never visited Chile.77
Indonesia expressed that its measure had been ratified to
protect consumers from the spread of new pests and diseases.78
It specified that it was free from Medfly79 (a variety of fruit
fly) and precautionary measures had been taken with respect to
nations that it deemed contaminated with Medfly. Indonesia has
argued that its maintenance of the ban on fruit products from
Chile is justified because the Indonesian Quarantine Agency
(“IQA”) determined that in 2013 Medfly was found in the
Valparaíso region of Chile, so a prohibition is warranted.80
Consequently, Chilean fruit has not been allowed through
the Jakarta port.81 While Indonesian law in 2013 allowed for
the retention of a Member’s pest-free status when outbreaks
were quickly detected and controlled, Chile was not afforded an
Fall 2016

opportunity to demonstrate that it had adequately dealt with its
alleged infestation.82 Chile again invited Indonesia to conduct a
technical visit in 2014 to ascertain if Chile’s expeditious eradication of the outbreak was complete, and, again, Indonesia did not
come.83 Chile also noted that other nations’ requests for recognition as fruit fly-free have been granted.84 Chile did suffer a new
(regional) outbreak of Medfly in July 2015.85

2. Russia-Pigs and Pork Products86
In March, 2014, the European Union (“EU”) expressed its
concerns about Russian measures raised in response to studies
that found prevalence of African Swine Fever (“ASF”) in four
wild boars in two of the EU’s Member states: Lithuania and
Poland.87 Russia noted that ever since the outbreak within its territory in 2008, ASF had caused significant harm to the Russian
economy, so it deemed the measures to be a proportionate and
necessary response.88 Russia expressed specific concerns that
the EU’s policy on ASF was not unified enough, and that it did
not ensure adequate protection from affected Members within
the Union.89 It feared that ASF infected animals and animal
products could pass between Members too freely.90 As a result,
Russia has banned the importation of pork products from
Lithuania91, Poland92, and the rest of the EU.93
The EU emphasized that it took immediate action to compartmentalize the affected areas and enacted stringent measures
to control the spread of ASF.94 The EU argued that in both the
outbreak in Lithuania and Poland, it kept Russia informed of the
situation and of the steps that were being taken.95 In fact, in the
case of the Lithuania outbreak, Russia, along with the Office of
Epizootics (“OIE”–also known as the World Organization for
Animal Health), partook in the expert mission to analyze the
SPS conditions in the region of the outbreak.96
The EU’s primary concern is that Russia’s approach to
bans on Polish and Lithuanian pork products was not done on
a regional basis but on a national one.97 Further, the EU argues
that the ban effectively is not contained to those two nations, but
rather is imposed on the EU as a whole.98
The European Union additionally expressed frustration at
the different treatment that it received compared to Ukraine.99
Ukraine suffered an outbreak of ASF in its Luhansk region,
which caused Russia to implement measures restricting trade in
pork products from that region but not from the whole country.100

III. Analysis
Under the analysis propounded in United States – Animals,
some Members are violating Article 6 of the SPS Agreement.101
As it has been difficult for the Membership to agree on the practical implementation and significance of this Article, the consequence of the analysis promulgated in United States–Animals
could be that some aspects of Article 6 have been effectively
decided for the Membership, as WTO decisions have indeed
affected international practices in the past.102 This has two
implications: first, the Panel decision makes the trade-efficient,
regional approach in Article 6 more concrete as precedent
accumulates.103 Second, this decision encourages Members to
reform their SPS measures through a regional approach in order
39

to avoid claims against them that are supported by the analysis
from United States–Animals.
The analysis from United States – Animals provides a clear
and complete assessment of Members’ obligations under Article
6.104 In this section, that analysis is applied to reveal the violations that prevail in Indonesia and Russia. The objective of this
analysis is to substantiate that in some countries, SPS measures
are implemented in violation of Article 6, either due to a misunderstanding of the obligations under that Article or due to the
unscrupulous intent of the implementing government wishing to
protect domestic markets. The two examples explored here are
the Indonesian ban on importation of fruits from Chile105 and the
Russian ban on importation of pigs and pork products from the
European Union.106 For clarity, a brief overview of the United
States – Animals’ Article 6 analysis is provided below preceding
the application of that analysis to the abovementioned examples.

1. A concise overview of the United States –
Animals analysis
The Analysis under United States – Animals proceeds as
follows: the first prong is an assessment of the trade-restricting
measure on its face.107 The goal of this assessment is to determine if the measure allows for the recognition of areas affected
by infestation or disease as separate from those that are not and
to determine if the measures permit different treatment of those
areas. It is a simple assessment of whether the measure recognizes unaffected areas and does not subject them to the same
measures as the affected areas.108 If the measure fails to do this,
then we proceed to the second prong of the analysis.
The second prong seeks to assess if that failure to recognize
pest and disease-free areas as separate from affected areas rises
to the level of a violation of Article 6.1 by not accommodating
for varied SPS conditions where accommodation is warranted.109
This is done through an assessment of the Member seeking recognition’s SPS characteristics110 to evaluate if a regional approach
would be warranted. It is at this stage that the obligation under
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement to seek relevant information
in a timely manner begins to take effect.111 If the Member that
imposed the measure did not have good reason to treat the areas
that its measure affects in a uniform manner, and it did not seek
out or willingly accept information that would help to tailor the
measure to the relevant areas, then there may be a violation of
Article 6.1. However, the third prong of the analysis may still
exonerate or condemn the measure-imposing Member.
The third and final prong is an assessment of whether the
Member seeking recognition has made a convincing showing
that the relevant region is, and is likely to remain pest or diseasefree. If throughout the process of requesting recognition, the
requesting Member fails to provide adequate evidence to objectively demonstrate that it is pest or disease-free, the failures of
the enacting Member to adapt its measure to regional conditions
may be forgiven.112
However, where the Member seeking recognition has provided evidence that adequately demonstrates its pest and disease-free status and it has requested recognition such status, the
40

measure-imposing Member is in a precarious situation. It is here
that the obligations under Articles 5.7 and 8 truly come into full
effect. Under Article 5.7, the enacting Member must have sought
relevant information “in a timely manner”113 so as to enable its
regional adaptation of its measure as appropriate. Under Article
8, the enacting Member must have proceeded with the Member
requesting recognition’s request for recognition “without undue
delay.”114 Failure to comply with those time requirements constitutes a violation of Article 6 of the SPS Agreement.

A. United States – Animals’ Article 6 framework
applied to Indonesia’s ban of Chilean fruit
When applying the framework that the United States –
Animals Panel used, it is important to recall that the claim in
that case was not that the United States’ law did not allow for
recognition of pest and disease-free areas, but that “as applied,”
the United States had failed to follow Article 6-compliant procedures to recognize such regions.115 In addition, the Panel’s
application of the time constraints in Articles 5.7116 and 8117
to the review process of such applications for recognition118 is
incorporated into the analysis below.
The first question to be answered is whether Indonesia
recognized the area(s) that were affected by a pest infestation
and the areas that were not, as separate.119 Indonesia’s measure
was applied to all of its trade partners, regardless of their peststatus, and the measure applied to all territories therein.120 The
port that Indonesia chose to close to fruit imports is one of its
two main ports for imports, and, specifically, it is a notable port
for importation of fruit products.121 Indonesia has the sovereign
right to close ports or impose bans, but it justified its ban based
on SPS characteristics, and therefore its measures must comply
with the SPS Agreement.122 Contrary to Indonesia’s obligations
under Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement, it imposed this ban
without recognizing regions within its trading partners’ territories as disease or pest-free areas. Further, this is contrary to
Indonesia’s obligation under the SPS Agreement to seek the least
trade restrictive means to achieve its protective goals.123
The next prong of the analysis is to establish if this failure
to recognize Chile, or areas of Chile, as pest-free, can rise to the
level of a violation of Article 6.1.124 An assessment of Chile’s
fruit fly status and the prevalence of this unwanted pest125 is
needed to determine if Indonesia’s measures are adapted to those
characteristics. Indonesia argued that its measure was maintained
with respect to Chile, because a relevant agency had information that the Valparaíso region of Chile had suffered an infestation of Medfly in 2013.126 The Valparaíso region accounts for
roughly two percent of Chile’s surface area, and the ban effects
all fruit products from Chile.127 Chile expeditiously eradicated
the infestation of Medfly128 and invited Indonesia to conduct a
technical visit to judge the efficaciousness of Chile’s eradication
program.129 No such visit ever occurred.130
In this light, Indonesia’s ban was not tailored to the SPS
conditions (fruit fly status) prevailing in Chile because it blocked
all fruit products from entry to its port, when its information
indicated that only two percent of Chile had a fruit fly problem.
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

However, this may be forgiven if Chile did not provide adequate
access to materials that would prove that areas of Chile were free
of pests.131 This requirement is unlikely to absolve Indonesia
because in addition to inviting Indonesia to perform its technical
visit, Chile has provided Indonesia with all relevant documentation for it to be declared a fruit fly-free nation and has requested
formal recognition as such on several occasions.132
Another important part of the Panel’s consideration in
United States – Animals was the time that the United States took
to review Argentina’s request for recognition.133 In Chile’s case,
the Indonesian import ban has been in place for three years and
seven months. Chile had been a fruit-fly free nation for two years
until the outbreak in July 2015.134 The new outbreak makes it
difficult to determine if a panel would consider this to constitute an “undue delay”135 of conducting a recognition process136
because the delay may be considered a precautionary measure,
and, given the outbreak, not “undue”. However, an outbreak still
does not necessitate an outright ban on fruit products; the United
States, for example, has elected to ban fruit products that harbor
medfly from affected regions in response to Chile’s outbreak as
opposed to all of Chile’s fruit products.137
Chile likely satisfied the third prong of the United States –
Animals analysis and met the burden of proof of showing that it
had fruit fly-free regions. The current infestation in Chile does
raise the question as to whether it carried its burden of proving
that areas in Chile are likely to remain fruit fly-free, but even
the current infestation is not prevalent throughout the entirety of
Chile.138 Thus, Indonesia’s failure to recognize the areas outside
of the Valparaíso region (and now the Tarapaca and Coquimbo
regions) and adapt its measure accordingly, likely constitutes a
violation of Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement.
Commentators have argued that the Indonesian economy
could benefit from a reduction of supply of foreign fruit and
vegetables, and thereby an increase in consumption of local
produce, and that this may have been a factor in limiting imports
through the measure at issue.139 Arguably, the Chilean government used delay tactics to draw out the time it would take to
get a region recognized and to maximize consumption of local
fruits.140 Obligations under Article 6 must be understood and
adhered to reduce such abuses. Indonesia’s ban on fruit exports
from all of Chile is a prime example of an over-trade restrictive
measure that must be seen as a violation of Article 6 of the SPS
Agreement.

B. United States – Animals’ Article 6 framework
applied to Russia’s ban of pigs and pork products
from the European Union
The European Union’s claim, similar to the case above, is
that as applied, Russia’s ban on pigs and pork products from
Poland, Lithuania, and the rest of the EU fails to recognize disease-free areas.141 The EU’s claim is that Russia not only failed
to recognize affected and unaffected areas as separate, but that
the measure is applied in a vastly over-broad manner.142
Russia’s measure is in violation of Article 6.1 of the SPS
Agreement because it treats areas affected by African Swine
Fall 2016

Flu and unaffected areas uniformly. The territories affected by
disease are parts of Poland and Lithuania, yet the measure as
applied does not recognize disease-free areas within the EU. The
scenarios in Lithuania and in Poland are very similar, and their
treatment from Russia both had impacts on the EU as a whole, so
they will be referenced interchangeably throughout this analysis.
Again, the first step of the analysis is to determine if Russia’s
ban recognizes areas that were affected by the outbreak and those
that were not as separate and affords those two groups different
treatment. Russia’s measure amounts to an EU-wide ban on pork
products. It does not recognize affected and unaffected areas as
separate, and does not afford them different treatment.143
The next step in the analysis is to determine whether
Russia’s failure to recognize the unaffected regions within
Lithuania, Poland, and, more broadly the EU as disease-free rises
to a violation of Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement.144 This is
accomplished through an assessment of the prevailing SPS characteristics of the relevant regions and determining if Russia’s
measures were adapted therefore.145 The relevant criteria listed
within Article 6.1 are the level of prevalence of the disease and
the measures that Lithuania, Poland, and the EU took to control
and eradicate the outbreak of ASF.146
The level of prevalence is demonstrative of the over-broad
nature of Russia’s measures.147 A mere four ASF-infected wild
boars that were detected in Lithuania and Poland were the
foundation for Russia’s EU-wide ban.148 Additionally, the EU
contended that scientific evidence showed that the disease found
in the boars within the EU territories matched the disease that
was found in boars in Russia, which would suggest that the risk
of “spread” of the disease is greatly reduced because it would
already be in Russia.149 Banning imports of pork and pork products from all of the EU due to the discovery of four ASF-infected
wild boars must be seen as overly broad, and not adapted to
regional conditions.
Analysis of the measures taken by Lithuania, Poland, and
the EU to disrupt the spread of ASF reveals the unbalanced
nature of Russia’s approach. The EU, along with Lithuania and
Poland, emphasized that they took immediate action to compartmentalize150 the affected areas and enact stringent measures to
control the spread of ASF.151 This approach is compliant with
the World Organization for Animal Health (the body that sets
international standards for animal health)152 and aims to isolate
the disease. Russia’s measure that bans the importation of pork
and pork products from the entire EU is not tailored to the conditions prevailing in Lithuania and Poland, or the EU.
Again, under the third prong of the analysis, if Russia had
implemented this broad measure as a safety precaution, and
then the EU failed to demonstrate that any portion of the EU
was going to remain ASF-free, then Russia’s failure to adapt
to regional conditions may have been excused.153 Russia’s
expressed reasons for applying its ban to all of the EU was for
fear that the internal measures in the EU were not stringent
enough to prevent the spread of ASF contamination.154 However,
the EU undertook the protocol modeled by the OIE155, the organization that is expressly mentioned by the SPS Agreement as
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the relevant international standard setting body, to neutralize the
four isolated cases of ASF.156 It is likely that this process can be
deemed adequate to deal with the presence of disease.
Pursuant to the completion of the EU’s process to isolate
these cases, it requested recognition of territories outside of the
infected areas as disease-free.157 That request was rejected.158
Lithuania, Poland, and the EU gave reasonable access to Russia
to demonstrate the EU’s eradication of ASF and the likelihood
that they would remain ASF-free. The EU argued that it kept
Russia informed of all ASF-related action taken in both Poland
and Lithuania.159 The EU additionally emphasized that it had
undergone extensive negotiations to come to a regionalized solution, but that was to no avail.160 Russia unfoundedly rejected the
EU’s requests for regional recognition and the two parties could
not come to an agreed upon approach through negotiations.161
Russia failed to take into account the information available
to it, and failed to adapt its measure within a reasonable period
of time under Article 5.7. It failed to process the EU’s requests
for recognition of disease-free areas without undue delay under
Article 8, and continues to fail to recognize such areas. These
failures establish Russia’s inability to adapt its measure to
regional conditions in accordance with Article 6.

free flow of trade is a cornerstone of the WTO, and to obstruct
trade where there is no sound reason to do so not only flies in the
face of that goal, but has important negative impacts on global
trade. Further, those negative impacts are concentrated on the
less developed Members, who are more vulnerable to pests and
disease.169

2. Why the violations in these case studies and

The time constraints under Articles 5.7 and 8 encourage
Members to adapt their measures to the actually prevailing SPS
conditions in a timely manner, which is directly in line with the
WTO objective of reducing trade barriers. Imposing an obligation to minimize the effects of measures in areas that have not
been affected by pests or disease, and an obligation to do so
in a timely manner ensures a logical reduction of unnecessary
restrictions on trade.171 Because of the “reasonable period of
time” and “without undue delay” requirements, Members wishing to impose barriers through SPS measures will be forced to
actively assess whether their measures are based on scientific
evidence172 of prevailing SPS conditions on a regional level.
Under this approach, measures that are regionally adapted to
actually prevailing SPS conditions will be the norm.

their progeny matter

The Indonesian ban on fruits from Chile and the Russian
ban on pork and pork products from the EU are demonstrative of
SPS measures that were implemented in a drastically over-broad
manner and in violation of the SPS Agreement. These measures
arguably may have been adopted in order to exploit economic
opportunities and not for the protection of human, animal, and
plant health. Regardless of the intent of the enacting party, these
measures restricted, and continue to restrict trade in a serious
manner. These cases elucidate the lack of understanding amongst
the WTO Membership that the SPS Committee has been trying
to resolve with respect to Article 6 of the SPS Agreement.162
Nevertheless, difficulty with implementation should not
cause a failure to implement. In the Committee’s 2008 guidelines
on the implementation of Article 6, it reiterated the importance
of recognizing exporting Members’ disease and pest-free areas
in an expeditious manner throughout the thirty-five paragraphs
of the document.163 The Committee suggested that Members
that have requested recognition multiple times, like Chile, 164
should be prioritized in the process, and that when the exporting Member quickly takes action in accordance with the relevant
international standard and restores the area to a disease or pestfree area, like Poland, Lithuania, and the EU,165 recognition
should be granted quickly.166 Yet, Members still fail to properly
adhere to Article 6 obligations, and continue to abuse SPS measures by using them for economically protective ends.
The requirement to tailor measures to regional conditions
is a logical one and one that has significant implications for
trade.167 Parts of a country with which safe trade can be conducted should be able to trade freely notwithstanding infections
or infestations that prevail elsewhere within that country.168 The
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IV. Recommendations
The implementation of Article 6 of the SPS Agreement
has plagued the WTO Membership since the SPS Agreement’s
inception. By giving substantive effect to Article 6, the legal
analysis set forth in United States–Animals addresses concerns
that exporting Members have repeatedly expressed at SPS committee hearings.170 This approach which properly incorporates a
“reasonable period of time” requirement for importing Members
to review their measures, and a requirement for Members to
undertake and complete reviews of exporting Members’ SPS
conditions “without undue delay,” should be permanently and
expressly adopted.

A. This reading of obligations under Article
6 fosters basing measures on sound, scientific
evidence and reducing barriers to trade

B. A reading without time constraints would
be gratuitous

Article 6 does not merely require Members to recognize the
concept of regionalization. In fact, to give Article 6 such little
effect is indefensible because it erodes the separation between the
obligations under paragraphs 6.1 and 6.2 of the SPS Agreement.
While 6.2 does facially only require Members to recognize the
concept of regionalization, 6.1 requires that Members “ensure
that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are adapted” to
regional conditions, which inherently requires a maintenance
of measures that are appropriately adapted even as conditions
change. Imposing the time constraints imposed by the United
States – Animals panel provides frustrated exporting Members
with a viable course of action, and provides permissibly protective importers a “reasonable” period of time during which they
can adjust their measures when conditions do change.173
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C. Striking the balance between sovereign rights
and free trade

Another important goal of the SPS Agreement is to maintain Members’ sovereign right to regulate imports to protect
human, plant, and, animal health.174 To some degree, it is a
hazardous proposition to oblige Members to recognize pest-free
or disease-free areas quickly when pests or diseases are in the
surrounding areas.175 Certainly a balance can be struck between
the importing State’s interest in protecting its populations and
the exporting State’s interest of being able to export goods from
healthy areas without unwarranted restrictions on those goods.
A possible mechanism by which this balancing could be
achieved would be to require the measure-imposing Member
to reach out to the affected Member to attempt to better tailor
the measure in accordance with the prevailing conditions within
an established timeframe. 176 For example, a regime wherein
the measure-imposing Members must work with the restricted
Members to adapt the imposed measure within 90 days of its
imposition would greatly increase the level of communication
between these Members, and would significantly reduce the
unnecessarily restrictive effects of these measures. This approach
maintains the protective capacity of the restricting Member by
enabling it to enact high barriers that it later tailors down as
appropriate. Thus, the restricting Member can appropriately
adapt its measure with adequate information thereby minimizing
the restriction on trade caused by the measure while successfully
protecting its plant, animal, and human populations.
As was demonstrated in the Indonesia and Russia case studies above,177 under the current regime the restricting Member can
elude communication or draw out recognition processes, thereby
continuing to impose its restriction. By forcing the restricting

party to begin the process, that Member is automatically more
involved than it is under the current system where that Member
need only notify the WTO Members of new restrictions that it
imposes.178 Placing an obligation to begin the regionalization of
a measure on the restricting Member incentivizes the appropriate party to take action because the restricted Member needs no
further incentive to try to get the restriction reduced than the
restriction itself, while the restricting Member may need the
threat of WTO litigation to push it away from protectionism. 179

V. Conclusion
The legal framework from United States – Animals applied to
current SPS measures confirms that violations of Article 6 of the
SPS Agreement are present throughout the WTO Membership.
That Panel’s analysis highlights Members’ obligations to expedite the recognition of regional SPS conditions and to adapt
measures appropriately, constituting an important advancement
in the development of logical and equitable trade regulation. This
progress may indeed be a new bastion particularly for developing nations that have been subject to overly restrictive SPS
measures by ensuring that they have reasonable market access
despite regional sanitary or phytosanitary concerns.
While the analysis is useful and edifies the appropriate way
to read Article 6 of the SPS Agreement, the questions still remain
as to how small a “region” can be, what constitutes an “undue
delay,” and what constitutes a “reasonable period of time” for
the purpose of this analysis. These questions represent the next
phase of interpretation of this Article and likely the next phase
of litigation at the Dispute Settlement Body. Further definition of
these terms is required in order for the Membership to be able to
properly implement this important Article and to further realize
the WTO’s goal of trade liberalization.
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